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University of Toronto
This special topic forum contains seven papers that illustrate many of the ways in
which management researchers can use formal tools—mathematical methods, simu-
lation, and formal logic—to develop management research. Here we offer an overview
of these methods and their advantages as tools for theory building.
A perusal of the pages of the Academy of
Management Review over the past decade
might lead one to conclude that formal methods
have no place in the development of manage-
ment theory. For example, we could find only
one article published in this journal between
1998 and 2007 that actually used a formal ap-
proach—analytic methods, a simulation, or for-
mal logic—to build its propositions. One there-
fore might naturally wonder why formal
approaches have not been more prevalent in
management research.
One possibility is that formal methods have
little to contribute to management theory. That
explanation seems unlikely to us (and not just
because the articles in this issue serve as exam-
ples that strongly contradict it). Consider the
disciplines on which management theory most
commonly draws: economics and sociology. In
nearly every theoretical article over the last de-
cade that appeared in the American Economic
Review, the authors used formal methods (al-
most exclusively analytic models). Even in soci-
ology, during the last ten years the American
Journal of Sociology (AJS) featured at least ten
articles in which the authors built theory using
formal approaches (divided fairly evenly across
the methods featured in this special topic fo-
rum). Given that AJS publishes far fewer articles
per year than AMR and that more than half of
those articles are empirical, the ratio of ten to
one would actually appear to understate the
extent to which sociology relative to manage-
ment favors the use of formal methods. Seeing
as how closely related social sciences have
gained greatly from formal approaches, one
might expect that management theory could
similarly benefit.
A second possibility is that management
scholars have not invested in acquiring the
skills required to use formal methods. That ex-
planation, too, appears to fall short, especially
when one considers the response to the call for
this special topic forum. We received a total of
seventy-five submissions—a wealth of riches.
Almost every one of these submissions, more-
over, came from someone in a business school,
and more than 90 percent of the authors hold
doctoral degrees from business schools (rather
than from, say, economics departments). We
also benefited from the advice of an extremely
high-quality pool of reviewers, many of whom
had never before been involved with AMR. This
overwhelming response surprised even us, the
STF guest editors. But it nonetheless reveals
that a large segment of management scholars
have the training to pursue formal approaches
to building theory, and, thus, a scarcity of
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skills cannot account for the infrequent use of
these tools in management research.
Although it falls beyond the scope of this in-
troductory essay to determine precisely the rea-
sons for the paucity of formal theory building in
management research, we speculate that at
least two factors come into play. First, we sus-
pect that readers, reviewers, and editors may
not fully appreciate the relative advantages of
formal versus informal approaches. They may
therefore feel that the investment involved in
reading and understanding these formal ap-
proaches is too dear. Second, those who do use
formal methods may not consider AMR as a po-
tential outlet simply because it has published so
few articles using these methods in the past. At
least partly in support of this second point, we
note that Management Science and Organiza-
tion Science regularly publish papers that use
analytic methods, simulations, and formal logic
to build management theory.
With this STF we hope to stimulate both the
demand for and the supply of management re-
search using formal approaches. By describing
formal approaches’ advantages and by demon-
strating them through example, we hope that
readers and reviewers will become more at-
tuned to the value of research that adopts a
formal approach to theory building. And by
demonstrating that AMR has an interest in pub-
lishing these papers, we hope to encourage
management researchers to use them more
often.
THE BENEFITS OF BUILDING THEORY
FORMALLY
Formal approaches to theory building come in
three main flavors, defined primarily by the
methods used for articulating assumptions and
then moving from those assumptions to propo-
sitions. In mathematical models the researcher
begins by outlining a set of mathematical con-
ditions that describe the phenomenon of interest
and then uses mathematical proofs to demon-
strate propositions that follow from them. In sim-
ulations (also known as computational models)
the theorist similarly writes a set of conditions
that represent the assumptions of the model, but
instead of validating their implications via an-
alytical proofs, he or she generates outcomes
computationally across ranges of values for the
parameters that determine those outcomes.
With formal logic, meanwhile, the researcher
translates natural language assumptions into
statements in symbolic logic and then uses
methods such as truth tables to prove the prop-
ositions implied by those statements. Although
these approaches vary somewhat in their
strengths and weaknesses for addressing par-
ticular theoretical questions, they nonetheless
share at least three strengths relative to verbal
theorizing (the natural language approach most
commonly pursued in management research): (1)
precision and transparency, (2) logical consis-
tency, and (3) an ability to identify unanticipated
implications.
Precision and Transparency
Debates over the meaning of certain terms in
the management literature have become notori-
ous. What constitutes a “resource” in the re-
source-based view? What is a “dynamic capa-
bility”? What does it mean to “learn” or to be
“boundedly rational”? Although these disputes
occasionally converge toward one accepted def-
inition, they can just as easily continue without
any apparent resolution, despite decades of de-
bate. Management, moreover, is not alone in
this situation; all of the social sciences have had
vigorous (and frequently unresolved) arguments
over the meanings of key concepts.
In large part, these debates over terms and the
applicability of theories reflect the imprecision
of natural languages, such as English. Natural
languages have evolved over time and continue
to change. For a variety of reasons, many, if not
most, words in natural languages therefore
have multiple meanings. Listeners and readers
attempt to infer which one of these meanings
the communicator intended by considering the
context in which they find it. But this process
leaves ample room for ambiguity and subjective
interpretation. One listener or reader might de-
cide that a phrase means something very differ-
ent from what another does.
Although one can attempt to communicate
ideas clearly through natural languages, the
very flexibility and instability of these lan-
guages make doing so an uphill battle. In con-
trast, mathematics and formal logic have been
designed with precision in mind. Because of this
precision, translating a natural language idea
into a formal, symbolic representation can be
challenging. Whereas one can state an assump-
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tion or a proposition in natural language with-
out even fully understanding the meaning of the
statement, formal languages require that the
communicator understand the concept deeply.
In fact, we assert that much of the value of using
formal methods stems from the fact that it forces
the researchers using them to think thoroughly
through the concepts they invoke. Once the the-
ory has been translated into a formal language,
everyone who sees it knows exactly what it
means. Although the informal interpretation of
the terms of the formal theory might vary from
reader to reader, the formal characterization en-
sures that all of these interpretations have a
common core.
That precision has at least two advantages in
management research. First, it facilitates the
accretion of knowledge. If different researchers
use the same term to refer to several different
concepts when they develop theoretical propo-
sitions, then it becomes exceedingly difficult to
understand whether and how their arguments
interact. Sometimes researchers duplicate effort
by forwarding fundamentally equivalent ideas
under new names. At other times progress
comes to a halt when researchers appear to ar-
rive at contradictory conclusions (perhaps be-
cause they use the same natural language
terms but imbue them with different meanings).
Second, empirical researchers can more eas-
ily and accurately test theoretical propositions
when little ambiguity surrounds the meaning
of—and, hence, the appropriate measurement
of—the central concepts. Progress in empirical
research comes primarily from the ability to fal-
sify theories. But without precise propositions,
one often cannot say whether an empirical test
refutes a theory or whether it simply fails to
operationalize it adequately.
Logical Consistency
No one intentionally forwards a logically in-
consistent argument, but it is nonetheless sur-
prisingly easy to do. For example, one might not
recognize an implicit assumption and therefore
might fail to identify some critical condition nec-
essary for the theory to hold. Or one might miss
the fact that two (or more) assumptions act in
opposite directions. Or, less crucially, one might
simply impose an unnecessary and possibly re-
dundant assumption. As theories become in-
creasingly involved and incorporate more and
more factors, the opportunities for errors of omis-
sion and commission inevitably increase.
But even if the assumptions have been cor-
rectly specified and stated, people still regularly
come to the wrong conclusions about the impli-
cations of those assumptions. The problem is
that when relying on verbal theorizing, people
rarely think logically through each stage of the
chain of an argument; rather, they rely on their
intuitions to identify the implications. Our intu-
itions, however, often prove wrong. Consider the
Monty Hall problem (Selvin, 1975). A contestant
on a game show can choose from curtain A, B, or
C. Two of the curtains have goats behind them
and one has a car; if the contestant picks the one
with the car, he wins it. Let’s assume that he
initially chooses curtain A. The host then opens
curtain B, which has a goat behind it, and asks
the contestant whether he would like to choose a
different curtain. Should he switch? Most people
believe that each of the remaining two curtains
has a 50 percent chance of having the car and,
therefore, that the contestant should be indiffer-
ent between staying with his original choice
and shifting to curtain C (Granberg & Brown,
1999). But mathematics demonstrates clearly
that the contestant should switch. In fact, his
original choice, curtain A, has only a one-third
chance of having the car behind it, whereas
curtain C has a two-thirds probability of being
the winning curtain (because the host intention-
ally chose a curtain that does not have the car
behind it, thereby revealing information about
the other option). One could therefore easily
imagine that someone developing a natural lan-
guage theory of the Monty Hall problem might
posit an intuitively appealing but incorrect
proposition. More generally, researchers who
rely entirely on verbal theorizing have little to
prevent them from arriving at errant conclu-
sions.
All formal approaches share the advantage of
having tools available for ensuring logical con-
sistency. Analytic models and formal logic use
proofs. Simulations meanwhile calculate the im-
plications of a variety of scenarios numerically.
In any of these approaches, researchers must
explicate all of the necessary assumptions, be-
cause without them they could not derive the
results. Redundant and superfluous assump-
tions, moreover, become relatively obvious
when writing proofs (although those using sim-
ulations cannot spot them so easily). Proofs and
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computational methods, furthermore, ensure
that the results do follow from the assumptions.
In the Monty Hall example, one could have used
any of these approaches to arrive at the correct
answer. The researcher might make an error in
the application of these methods, but, because
the rules are clearly defined, readers and re-
viewers alike can easily audit the assumptions
and the chains of logic leading to the proposi-
tions.
Unanticipated Implications
The availability of these tools has another
added benefit: one can use them to derive un-
anticipated implications of the assumptions.
Most exercises in verbal theorizing involve rec-
ognizing a relationship between two factors—
say, resources and profitability—and then try-
ing to determine a set of assumptions that
would lead to such a relationship. In essence,
one moves backwards from propositions to as-
sumptions. A clear disadvantage of this ap-
proach is that one cannot find the unexpected
(though it may later rear its head in empirical
research testing these propositions). In contrast,
formal approaches can help the researcher
identify even the most surprising and counterin-
tuitive implications that might follow from a set
of assumptions.
Consumers of research using formal ap-
proaches often cannot fully appreciate this abil-
ity to identify unanticipated implications, for
two reasons. In some cases, when these impli-
cations clearly run counter to reality, they may
force the theorist to revisit the initial premises of
the model and, therefore, may appear only as an
intermediate (and unpublished) stage of the re-
search. In other cases, by the time they appear
in print, not only have these implications been
derived but the intuition underlying them has
been explicated and therefore the results—
though originally surprising—may even seem
somewhat obvious (if only in retrospect).
But the value of this ability to explicate more
completely the implications of a set of assump-
tions can be seen in the breadth of propositions
derived from relatively simple models. Readers
new to formal approaches are often surprised by
the complexity of the behaviors that emerge
from relatively few assumptions. Simulations of
the behavior of flocks of birds, herds of animals,
and schools of fish, for example, have demon-
strated that a very small number of rules (as few
as three) can generate realistic simulations of
groups of animals in motion (Reynolds, 1987). In
management research, Postrel (this issue) also
illustrates the wide range of implications that
one can derive from a small set of assumptions.
Beyond simply generating additional interest-
ing propositions, this ability to identify unin-
tended implications also accelerates progress
in understanding a phenomenon. Additional
propositions offer empirical researchers more
targets—more opportunities to falsify the theory.
If the propositions follow from the assumptions
and empirical analysis falsifies one or more of
these propositions, then this suggests that one
or more of the assumptions must not hold as
well. Researchers must then revisit their theo-
ries.
ANALYTIC MODELS, SIMULATIONS, AND
FORMAL LOGIC
Despite these advantages, each approach to
formal theory building is not without its limita-
tions. The use of mathematical methods, for ex-
ample, sometimes requires unappealing as-
sumptions. Simulations have the disadvantage
of only being able to prove the existence of a
relationship between a set of inputs and an out-
come; they cannot determine the necessity of a
set of conditions. Formal logic, meanwhile, does
not as readily accommodate functional forms of
relationships and, thus, cannot always adjudi-
cate between the expected effects of counter-
vailing forces.
Each of these limitations nevertheless applies
only to a particular formal approach. These
trade-offs, therefore, might constitute a reason
for choosing one formal method over another,
but none of them suggests that one would want
to eschew formal methods altogether. Although
it is beyond the scope of this introduction to
review each approach in detail, let us expand a
little on the relative strengths of each.1
1 For those who wish to delve more deeply into one or
more of these approaches, we recommend Harrison, Lin,
Carroll, and Carly (2007) for simulation and Hannan, Po´los,
and Carroll (2007) for formal logic. Mathematics includes
such a vast array of approaches and tools that we cannot
recommend any single survey.
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Analytic Models
Some see analytic models as the “gold stan-
dard” of formal approaches. The translation of
assumptions and definitions into mathematical
statements and then the use of proofs to validate
propositions mean that these methods impose a
strict discipline on clarity and logical consis-
tency. The use of mathematics, moreover, allows
one to model the interactions of many, many
“moving parts”—pieces of the model that influ-
ence its behavior—with the confidence that
one’s conclusions do indeed follow from one’s
premises.
Both the greatest strength and the greatest
limitation of analytic methods stem from the
need to produce a model with analytically trac-
table solutions. On the positive side, mathemat-
ical methods encourage the theorist to distill a
situation to its essence. Consider, for example,
the prisoner’s dilemma game. This scenario el-
egantly captures the problem of shirking in
team cooperation. It does not describe all of the
complexity of a real-life encounter, but it does
capture the problem’s essential features. By ab-
stracting away from the details of a particular
case, it provides deep insight into an entire
class of situations. Indeed, the art of analytic
analysis appears in the ability to identify, to
abstract, and to match to a mathematical ap-
proach the essential elements of the situation
being modeled. But sometimes the depiction of a
situation does not fit well with any analytical
framework. Attempts to force it into one may
therefore result in a theory with little face
validity.
Simulation
In situations that elude mathematical meth-
ods, simulation may provide an attractive alter-
native. Before moving forward, we should note
that although simulation research sometimes
refers to particular sets of inputs as “experi-
ments” and the results of these experiments as
“data,” simulation is almost always an exercise
in theory building; it is not empirical research.
Simulations run the gamut, from the simple to
the complex. The primary advantage of these
computational models relative to analytic meth-
ods is that they allow much greater flexibility in
certain sorts of assumptions made by the theo-
rist. For example, simulations can accommodate
any functional form linking two (or more) vari-
ables that a theorist might imagine. But simula-
tions also have their own constraints. The inves-
tigation of some classes of problems—such as
games with an infinite number of periods—
remains computationally intractable, even with
access to colossal computer power. Whether
mathematical methods or simulation offers the
preferable approach, therefore, depends on the
problem.
Relative to analytic models, simulations have
at least two disadvantages. First, because the
method itself imposes relatively less discipline
on the theorist, these models can become so
complex that their inner workings end up being
opaque. One can still observe how outcomes
vary with changes in the inputs, but the interac-
tions become so convoluted as to prevent the
researcher from being able to determine why
these relationships exist. When the individual
components of the simulation are well under-
stood, however, even such highly detailed and
complex simulations can be useful. For exam-
ple, physicists often build incredibly compli-
cated simulations to determine the expected be-
havior of large-scale systems. They understand
the behavior of each component—for example, a
molecule or an elementary particle—extremely
well, and they also have detailed knowledge of
how small numbers of these components inter-
act, but they must nonetheless rely on simula-
tions to predict the behavior of hundreds, thou-
sands, millions, or even billions of these
components.
Second, simulation does not constitute a
proof. Simulations sample a finite, although po-
tentially very large, number of cases from an
infinite set of possibilities (at least when the
model includes continuous parameters). One
therefore can say that some specific set of as-
sumptions leads to a particular outcome, but
one does not know whether any of those as-
sumptions are necessary, or whether some
unanalyzed set of assumptions might also prove
sufficient to yield the results. Sampling the pa-
rameter space as widely and with as fine a
resolution as possible can help to allay these
concerns, but it does not alleviate them.
In many cases, theorists can combine simula-
tion methods with analytic techniques, captur-
ing a little bit of the best of both approaches. A
researcher might, for example, build a simpli-
fied model that does not incorporate all of the
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interesting features of a phenomenon but that
does fit within the restrictions of some mathe-
matical framework. After characterizing that
model, he or she might then exploit computa-
tional methods to relax some of the assumptions
or to extend the features of the model. Such an
approach nicely exploits the ability of analytic
methods to identify both necessary and suffi-
cient conditions while still allowing the consid-
eration of those cases that stymie analytic anal-
ysis (but that remain amenable to simulation).
Formal Logic
In many ways, formal logic is similar to math-
ematical methods. Indeed, mathematics uses
first-order logic. Since many of the applications
of formal logic to management and organiza-
tions also rely on first-order logic, such as Pe´li’s
(this issue), formal logic papers differ little in
their relative strengths and limitations from pa-
pers using mathematical methods.
The biggest difference between formal logic
and both analytic and simulation methods
arises when researchers select or define alter-
native logics (i.e., other than first-order logic). In
management research, for example, Hannan et
al. (2007) have developed a nonmonotonic log-
ic—a formal language—for theory building (for
an example of the application of this logic, see
Kuilman, Vermeulen, and Li, this issue). This
logic includes a number of modifiers and rela-
tionships that allow the researcher to represent
more accurately the incompleteness of our em-
pirical understanding of a phenomenon. For ex-
ample, it allows quantifiers like “normally” and
“presumably” that first-order logic cannot ac-
commodate (and defines a consistent set of rules
for dealing with these quantifiers). Thus, it can
provide a more realistic basis for developing
and combining theory fragments describing
phenomena that still require a great deal of
empirical exploration.
Although the ability to develop the language
used to build theory might seem to reduce dra-
matically the discipline imposed by formaliza-
tion on theorists, logicians have developed a
strict set of rules that all formal languages
should meet to ensure their precision and com-
pleteness. All formal logics therefore have the
rigor of mathematical methods, requiring pre-
cise assumptions and definitions and allowing
one to prove propositions and to identify neces-
sary and sufficient conditions.
Formal methods provide powerful tools for de-
veloping theory, but we would not claim that
verbal theorizing—that is, the use of natural lan-
guages to build theory—has no place in man-
agement research. Whereas formal methods op-
erate deductively, natural languages more
readily accommodate induction and intuition.
Hence, when an interesting phenomenon is first
identified, conjectures, expressed in natural lan-
guages, can provide a useful starting point.
These conjectures can help to guide empirical
researchers in terms of what data they should
collect and what questions they should attempt to
answer. As the phenomenon becomes better un-
derstood, researchers can then revisit the theory
with formal tools to develop a more precise, trans-
parent, and logically consistent description of it.
THE PAPERS IN THIS TISSUE
As noted above, we had an embarrassment of
riches from which to choose. We selected papers
for this special topic forum not just for their
high quality and the importance of their man-
agerial implications but also for their ability
to highlight the variety and value of formal
approaches.
Because of the breadth of papers in the special
issue, we could have ordered them in multiple
ways. We ended up choosing a rough grouping by
subject, but the papers have many other points of
contact.
The first three papers deal broadly with the
issue of entrepreneurial entry, but each ap-
proaches it using a different formal method. Al-
varez and Parker model the decision problem of
how a pair of entrepreneurs should allocate the
rights to control a new venture. Although per-
fectly rational actors would give control to the
higher-ability member of the team, these au-
thors interestingly demonstrate that, under con-
ditions of subjective rationality, the team will
allocate control rights to the more optimistic of
the two.2 This misallocation of control rights can
2 Subjective rationality refers to the idea that actors must
behave in a way that appears optimal, given their beliefs
and observations of the environment, but that may not be
rational for the omniscient actor (Ryall, 2003).
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lead start-ups to perform poorly. Given the well-
known propensity of entrepreneurs to be over-
optimistic, this result strikes us as particularly
interesting.
Ganco and Agarwal, meanwhile, construct a
simulation so as to develop a better understand-
ing of the performance differentials between
start-ups and diversifying entrants, and how
those differentials depend on the environment.
They build their simulation on a variant of the
NK model that has been widely used in manage-
ment research (e.g., Rivkin, 2000). Their model,
extending the counterintuitive idea that adapta-
tion actually hurts organizations in turbulent
environments, can account for all of the existing
empirical regularities that have been found and
suggests several new propositions that re-
searchers should explore.
Finally, Kuilman, Vermeulen, and Li consider
how the nature of the environment at the time of
founding influences the life chances of entrants.
Empirical research has usually found that firms
that enter during periods of intense competitive
crowding suffer higher mortality rates. But some
studies have also found the opposite pattern:
lower mortality rates among those that enter
during times of higher density. The articles re-
porting these findings appear to arrive at con-
tradictory conclusions, but Kuilman et al. dem-
onstrate that one can incorporate them into a
single theory by introducing the stage of the
population’s history as an additional factor.
Whether density at the time of founding consti-
tutes an advantage or a disadvantage depends
on whether the population remains in the legit-
imating phase or whether it has achieved legit-
imacy and interactions have become primarily
competitive. In essence, the authors introduce a
scope condition.
We should note that the application of the
nonmonotonic logic in this paper is particularly
instructive. Whereas the logic that Kuilman et
al. use would have allowed them to resolve
these conflicting findings simply by assuming
that legitimacy takes precedence over competi-
tion (or vice versa), they avoid this easy solution
because they have no good substantive reason
to introduce a precedence ordering between
competition and legitimacy. Therefore, they
wisely avoid such an ad hoc assumption.
The next two papers investigate, again
broadly, the problem of coordination and incen-
tives. Postrel introduces the novel idea of goal
ambiguity into the well-understood effects of
substitution versus complementarity in joint
production. He shows that goal ambiguity can
lead to a failure in the allocation of effort, even
when both actors have incentives only in terms
of their joint output. Although this failure looks
like a coordination problem, standard solutions
to coordination failures, such as sequencing ac-
tors’ decisions, may not solve this problem and
may even exacerbate it. The managerial impli-
cations are clear: coordination and goal clarifi-
cation have synergistic effects on team perfor-
mance.
Makadok and Coff similarly explore an issue
of clear managerial importance: How can a prin-
cipal (an owner) ensure that agents (employees)
do not free ride? In developing their theory, they
point out that the manager actually has at least
three levers under his or her control in achieving
this outcome: authority, incentives, and owner-
ship. All of these vary from being more firm-like
to being more market-like. Managers therefore
have eight different forms of hybrid organiza-
tion at their disposal, and these authors demon-
strate that at least one of them should generate
the optimal allocation of effort across the agents
for any type of task.
Finally, we end with two pieces that provide
new insight into macroorganizational behavior.
Cowan and Jonard develop a model of alliance
formation in which successful partnership re-
quires that two firms have moderately similar
characteristics. They demonstrate that this sin-
gle assumption can generate a surprisingly
wide variety of network structures, including a
tendency for repeated interaction and small-
world structures. Their results therefore raise
the possibility that the need for somewhat sim-
ilar partners, rather than social factors, may ex-
plain a number of interorganizational struc-
tures. Since one could imagine the development
of a parallel model at the level of the individual,
their results may also provide insight into inter-
personal networks.
Pe´li, meanwhile, attempts to reconcile the
idea that inertia and imprinting imply that pop-
ulation-level change should occur through the
selection [failure] of organizations with the intu-
ition that populations sometimes shift through
the adaptation of their individual members. To
resolve this apparent inconsistency, he suggests
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that environmental change may either be quan-
titative or qualitative in nature. The first, a
quantitative change, might force firms to adjust
their intensity of various activities, but the sec-
ond, a qualitative change, requires them to do
entirely different things to survive. The former
therefore allows adaptation, while selection
reigns supreme in the latter regime. Pe´li’s ap-
proach to resolving this conundrum recalls a
similar solution that he posited for resolving
when broad versus narrow scope would benefit
organizations (Pe´li, 1997).
We applaud the authors included in this spe-
cial topic forum for their creative and compel-
ling contributions to management theory and for
their able applications of formal methods. We
also appreciate the efforts of all of those who
took an interest in our call. We hope that the
papers that appear here become but the begin-
ning of a long line of interesting and insightful
investigations that use formal approaches to de-
velop management theory.
REFERENCES
Granberg, D., & Brown, T. A. 1999. The Monty Hall dilemma.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21: 711–729.
Hannan, M. T., Po´los, L., & Carroll, G. R. 2007. Logics of
organization theory: Audiences, codes and ecologies.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Harrison, J. R., Lin, Z., Carroll, G. R., & Carly, K. M. 2007.
Simulation modeling in organizational and manage-
ment research. Academy of Management Review, 32:
1229–1245.
Pe´li, G. 1997. The niche hiker’s guide to population ecology:
A logical reconstruction of organizational ecology’s
niche theory. Sociological Methodology, 27: 1–46.
Reynolds, C. W. 1987. Flocks, herds and schools: A distrib-
uted behavioral model. Computer Graphics, 21: 25–34.
Rivkin, J. W. 2000. Imitation of complex strategies. Manage-
ment Science, 46: 824–844.
Ryall, M. D. 2003. Subjective rationality, self-confirming equi-
librium and corporate strategy. Management Science,
49: 936–949.
Selvin, S. 1975. On the Monty Hall problem. American Stat-
istician, 29: 134.
Ron Adner (ron.adner@dartmouth.edu) is associate professor of business administra-
tion at the Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College. He received his Ph.D. from the
University of Pennsylvania. His current research interests include demand-based
approaches to strategy, diversification, and innovation ecosystems.
La´szlo´ Po´los (laszlo.polos@durham.ac.uk) is professor of organizational theory at
Durham University. He received his Ph.D. from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
His current research focuses on translating the theory fragments of organizational
ecology into formal logic and using that foundation as a basis for extending the
theory.
Michael Ryall (m.ryall@mbs.edu) is associate professor of strategy at Melbourne
Business School, University of Melbourne. He received his Ph.D. from UCLA. His
research focuses on the formal theoretical foundations of strategy.
Olav Sorenson (olav.sorenson@rotman.utoronto.ca) is the Jeffrey S. Skoll Chair in
Technical Innovation and Entrepreneurship and professor of strategic management at
the Rotman School of the University of Toronto. He received his Ph.D. from Stanford
University. His research interests include entrepreneurship and economic geography,
organizational learning, organizational ecology, and the management of science and
technology.
208 AprilAcademy of Management Review

